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RACE, EQUALITY AND THE RULE OF
LAW: CRITICAL RACE THEORY'S
ATTACK ON THE PROMISES OF
LIBERALISM
I NTRODUCTION
In recent years, critical race theory ("CRT") has come to occupy
a conspicuous place in American law schools.' The theory holds that
despite the great victories of the civil rights movement, liberal legal
thought2 has consistently failed African Americans and other minori-
I See generally Stephanie 14. Goldberg, The Law, a New Theory Holds, Has a White Voice, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1992, at A23 (describing critical race theory as having had "all undeniable impact
on legal education"); Neil A. Lewis, For Black Scholars Wedded to Prism of Rare, New and Separate
Goals, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at Al 4 (noting that critical race theorists "ate on the litculty
almost every major law school"); Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Grits: 0]. Simpson, Critical
Rare Theory, the Law, and the Triumph of Color in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27
(hook review) (observing that critical race theory "has gained increasing currency in the legal
academy").
2 It is IDA possible to explain adequately the liberal tradition in American legal thought within
the bounds of this short essay. In brief, my argument assumes that the "consensus school" of
American political thought is coned: agreement on certain liberal principles lies at the core of
American politics, and all political disputes, (including those over race, class, gender and sexual
orientation), take place it) the context of that broad consensus, See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); SAMUEL HUN'FINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROM-
ISE OF DISHARMONY (1981); GUNNAR. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (20th 1111111V eel. 1902)
(1944); ALEXIS DE MOVE-VILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Richard I). [fennel . ed., Mentor
1956); GottnoN Wool:), THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (Norton 1972)
(1969). But see ROGERS SNIITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997) (rejecting consensus school, argidng instead that. America contains "multiple
traditions" of liberalism and bigotry); Rogers Smith, 13eyond Tocqueuille, Myrdal, and Hartz: The.
Multiple Traditions in America, 87 Am. Pot.. Set. REV. 549, 558-563 (1993) (further disputing
consensus school), Liberal principles are so ingrahied in political and legal discourse in the
United States that they are hardly mentioned anymore, but they have structured and moderated
political and legal debate for Incite than two centuries and are likely to do so long into the ['WW1!,
See generally I1ARTZ, supra. They include government with the consent of the governed; repre-
sentative democracy; guaranteed liberties and equal citizenship; separated institutions checking
and balancing each other until consensus is reached, and multiple "sovereignties," including
those of states, local governments and individuals. See liesrriNGioN, supra, at 14. These basic
principles (and there are more) are embodied in the higher law of constitutions, which ate
enforced (some of the time) by reasonably independent judges (chosen through political proc-
esses) under a system that aspires to the ride "of laws, and not of men," See Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Judges make their decisions case-hrcase, justifying their
choices according to a system of precedent and reasoning by analogy., but with some freedom to
reshape the law incrementally, and even to overrule precedents on occasion. See generally EDWARD
H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION 'to LEGAL. REASONING (1048). Adherence to these general principles
is nearly universal in the United States, and defines people as being "American" more accu rately
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ties. 3
 Critical race theorists attack the very foundations of the liberal
legal order, including equality theory,' legal reasoning, 5 Enlightenment
rationalism' and neutral principles of constitutional law.' These liberal
values, they allege, have no enduring basis in principle, but are mere
social constructs calculated to legitimate white supremacy. 8 The rule
of law, according to critical race theorists, is a false promise of princi-
pled government, and they have lost patience with false promises.' For
them, the practice of law is just another front in the fight to achieve
racial "liberation." 10
The "race-crits," as they call themselves,'' identify less with the
egalitarian integrationists who led the non-violent civil rights move-
me ► t than with the black nationalists of the late 1960s who demanded
"black power."' 2 While critical race theorists purport to share the liber-
als' goal of racial and social justice, they view that endeavor not as a
matter of principle, but as a matter of simple group interest to be
than characteristics such as national origin, ethnicity or religion. See HUNTINGTON, 511pra, at 18,
30. My criticism of critical race theory proceeds from these basic principles. See infra notes
205-346 and accompanying text.
3 See infin notes 82-147 and accompanying text.
4 See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 377 (1992) [hereinafter Bell,
Realism) (arguing that "a commitment to racial equality merely perpetuates [blacks'] disempow-
erment").
5 See id. at 376 (arguing dim "[p[ recedent, rights theory, and objectivity merely are formal
rules that serve a covert purpose," i.e., legitimating racism).
Ii See RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND
RACE 142-145 (1995) [hereinafter RODRIGO CHRONICLES] (arguing that Enlightenment philoso-
phy "is the very means by which [minorities] are kept down").
7 See MARL MATSUDA ET. AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECII, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1993) [hereinafter WORDS THAT WOUND] ("Critical race
theory expresses skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality . . . .").
8 Seeid. (slating that critical race theory investigates how "traditional interests implicated in
the staters quo" serve as "vessels of racial subordination").
See RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES OF
AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 45 (1996) [hereinafter RACE WAR) (staling
that "the rule ()flaw in all its majesty never holds for [minorities], but always for [thei•] adversaries
or for empowered groups"); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, in CRITICAL RAGE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 63,
63 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter KEY WRITINGS] (arguing that "black
people" understand that any "claim to neutral application of legal principles is false").
I' See Charles Las4ence, The Vt'ard and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, in KEY
WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 336, 340 [hereinafter Lawrence, Word & River].
II See Angela Harris, Foreword, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 742
(1994).
12 See generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS
OF LIBERATION (1967); see also WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 6 (critical race theory
"borrows from .. nationalism"); Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, in KEY WRITINGS, SiIpra note
9, at 127, 150 (critical race theorist asserts that black nationalism is a useful guide for race reform).
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achieved "by any means necessary." 13 They have no qualms arguing for
jury nullification on the basis of racial affinity," hate-speech codes
which criminalize bigoted expression'' or group rights doctrines which
would allow victims of historic racism to sue whites as a group for
reparations.' 6 The harmful precedents such measures would establish
is of little concern to the race-crits—their goal is minority advancement
at all costs.' 7
This Note criticizes CRT as au unprincipled, divisive and ulti-
mately unhelpful attack on the liberal tradition ill America." First,
race-crits fail to offer replacements for liberalism's core values.'• Rath-
er, their postmodern rejection of all principles leaves them entirely
"critical," while their narrow, interested stance renders them mere
advocates within the liberal legal system, not theorists who might offer
better alternatives. 20 Second, despite their undeniable energy, the race-
emits are remarkably unhelpful as legal and political advocates within
the liberal system. Their wholesale rejection of the rule of law limits
0 See Malcolm X, At the Audubon, in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 116 (George Breitman ed., Grove
Weidenfeld Evergreen 1990) (1960).
14 See generally Paid Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) 'hereinafter Butler, Black Power] (arguing that black jurors
should acquit black defendants charged With certain crimes, such as drug-dealing, on the basis
of m•ial affinity, regardless of the evidence, because Mere are too Many black men in jail).
15 See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEPEND NAZIS? HATE, SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997) [hereinafte• MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?]
(arguing for more "realist" First Amendment that would allow censorship of hate speech).
16 See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 67-79.
17 See Alan Freeman, Derr/eh Bell—Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, in CarricAL
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING Eocr. 458-59 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereina•ter CurriNc.
EDGE.] (stating that Derrick Bell judges legal doctrine by its "results" alone); LaWIPCIICC, Word &
River; supra note 10, at 340 (arguing that critical race theorists evaluate "work product," such as
"judicial opinions, legislation, organizing tactics, ideas, theory, [and] poetry" according to "the
degree to which the effort serves the cause of liberation").
18 See infra notes 205-346 and accompanying text. Other writers have criticized CRT from
different angles. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER Se SUZANNA SI I ERRY, BEYOND ALI. REASON: -rill: RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (criticizing "radical multicattu•alists," including
critical race theorists, for abandoning objectivity, reason and truth in legal discourse); Steven G.
Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. BIN, 193 (1996) (criticizing
CRT's advocacy of suppressing hate speech); Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (stating that critical race theorists have not proven their claims
of racism in the legal academy); Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 2,
1997, at 46 (book review) (stating that critical race theorists' use of narrative rather than objective
analysis makes enlightening dialogue with them impossible); Richat d A. Posner, The Skin Trade,
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct, 13, 1997, at 40 (criticizing CRT for having "succumbed completely to
posimodernist absurdity"); Rosen„inprzi note 1, at 27 (describing arr as "a stark challenge to
the liberal ideal of the rule of law").
19 See infra notes 262-99 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 202-99 and accompanying text.
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their persuasiveness as legal advocates, while their dismissal of Amer-
ica's guiding principles makes them politically ineffective.2 ' In the
process, the race-crits' racialist, blame-game rhetoric does much to
alienate potentially helpful whites. 22 .
My disagreement with the race-crits has less to do with their
long-term goals than with their diagnoses and solutions. Disadvantage
in the United States continues to fall too heavily on racial minorities. 25
Inequities in criminal justice, 2' immigration law25 and welfare "reform"
remain rampant, 2" but are due to much more than simple bigotry. 27
The most important political problem today is to prepare all persons
to survive and prosper in a service-oriented, information-driven econ-
omy. 28
 Inequalities in wealth are growing because low-skilled jobs are
leaving for third-world shores, while better paying jobs increasingly
require advanced education. 29
Addressing these problems is a tall order, and will not be advanced
very far by academic demands for race-based benefits. Indeed, the very
idea of race-based measures as a remedy for economic disadvantage is
collapsing as Americans come to think less in terms of black and white
and more in terms of a diverse rainbow of colors, with many hues in
between.'" So long as race was a reasonable proxy for disadvantage, as
21 See infia notes 300-41 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text.
23 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGESS AND RESENTMENT.IN
AMERICA'S "RACIAL' CRISIS 27-48 (1997).
24 See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMIS-
SION 99-129 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (hereinafter THE REAL WAR ON CRIME) (describing
unequal incarceration of black Americans).
25 See Anthony DePahni, New Rules at U.S. Borders Provoke Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1997, al Al; Anthony Lewis, The Quality of Pilerty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,1999, at A31 (describing
Draconian and largely random deportations that take place under 1996 immigration law).
26 See Jason DeParle, As Welfare Rolls Shrink, Load on Relatives Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1999, at Al (reporting that recent welliire overhaul has increasingly forced relatives of young
children, especially grandmOthers, to care for diem).
27 See generally THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) (describing complicated reasons for
rightward shift in American politics between 1900s and 1980s); PATTERSON, supra note 23 (argu-
ing that while minorities in U.S. have made great progress over last several decades, inequalities
remain due to complicated mix of economic, political and cultural factors); Jeffrey J. Pyle, Crime,
Punishment, and the Rise of Retributive justice in the United States, 1965-1997 (1997) (unpub-
lished B.A. thesis, Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.) (on file with the Trinity College library)
(arguing that rise of retributive criminal Justice policies in recent decades is partly due to
changing, race-based stereotypes about criminals).
28 See PATTERSON, Su/Ira note 23, at 186.
20 See id.
SO See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE:
ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 541-43 (1997) (noting important differences within racial groups);
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it was in the wake of de jure segregation, identity-group remedies like
race-based affirmative action made a great deal of sense.'" Rut, as the
black middle class has grown and Americans have come to recognize
wide economic and cultural differences within (and not just between)
ethnic groups, such claims have lost some of their force." 2 Thus, when
critical race theorists treat civil rights law as a species of interest-group
politics, they surrender the moral high ground of constitutional prin-
ciple and risk being seen as just another group clamoring for benefits,"
Such advocacy does nothing for disadvantaged minorities in America.
I. BACKGROUND
No single manifesto defines critical race theory. Attempts at syn-
thesizing its variations are rare, and ultimately prove inore elusive than
enlightening.'" This section will attempt to evaluate the movement's
most common assertions.'"
A. Desaiptive Elements
Critical race theory purports to (I) describe race and racism in
America to and (2) show how the liberal legal system reflects and per-
petuates "racial subordination." 7
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AA/ERI-
CAN INSTITUTIONS 144 (2d ed. 1980) (staling that economic changes make it "increasingly
difficult to speak of a single or unifbrm black experience").
31 Much of the early advocacy for affirmat ive . act ion rested on the fact that black Americans
were overwhelmit ugly pool: See, e.g., Lyndon Baines Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights: Commence-
mem Address at Howard University, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SoCIAI. jUs•ICE OR REVERSE Dis-
CRIMINATION? 56, 59 (Francis J. Beckwith & Todd E. Jones eds., 1997) (stating that 'Negroes are
trapped ... in inherited, gateless poverty").
32 See TIIERNSTROM & - 1 -HERNSTROM, SUpra note 30, at 541-43.
33 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Canvergence Dilemma,
in 4y WRITINGS, supra TIOIC 9, at 20 [hereinafter Bell, Interest-Convergened; Kitliberlê Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Rellenchment, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 103, 117 thereinafter Cren-
shaw, Race., Reform].
'14 See generally An Ilion}, V. Allied, Black and White, l 0 LA RAZA I.J. 561 (1998) (book review);
Harris, supra note I I. See also KEY WRITINGS, Stipa note 9, al xiii-xxxii; WORDS THAT WOUND,
supra note 7, at 1-15. Two representative compilations of critical race theory exist. See CUTTING
EDGE, supin note 17; KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9.
35
 This Note necessarily groups many critical race theorists together in an effort at synthesis,
Not all race-crits necessarily' subscribe to every assertion pin forth in this summary, which attempts
merely to outline the.major themes addressed by CRT's leading lights, See infra notes 36-204 and
accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 38-81 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 82-147 and accompanying text.
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1. Race and Racism in America
All CRT writers believe, in varying degrees, that "racism is endemic
to American life." 48
 While mainstream civil rights reformers assume
that racism is a product of ignorance and can be overcome by educa-
tion, critical race theorists insist that racism is pervasive and immuta-
ble, and "lies at the very heart of American—and western—culture."39
To critical race theorists, white racism is a "defect in the collective
unconscious,'" )
 a cultural phenomenon that automatically "reproduces
hierarchy" even in the absence of conscious discrimination. 4 ' In a racist
society, everyone is either an "outsider".or an "insider,"42 a "victim" or
a "perpetrator."4S Much as Marx described human history as a perma-
nent conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, 4 ' the race-.
crits view American society as a zero-sum conflict between powerful
white males and powerless minorities that cannot be mitigated by other
affinities or commonalities. 45
Race-cri Ls do not arrive at this conclusion empirically; nor do they
acknowledge alternative explanations for disadvantage, such as low
wages, job insecurity, limited inheritances, absence of health benefits,
poor labor markets or access to quality education. 46 Inconvenient facts
do not long detain them because they value ammunition more than
nuance or complexity. 47 They are also part of the postmodernist left, an
academic movement that insists that all knowledge is "socially construc-
ted,"8 and therefore inherently subjective, contingent and immune to
36 See 'Nouns TIIAT WOUND, Supra note 7, at 6.
Is Harris, supra note 11, at 749.
4° Id. at 771; see also Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 235,237 [hereinafter Lawrence, Id, Ego]
(arguing that "we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.").
11 See RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 14-19.
42 See generally KEY ‘VRITINGS, supra note 9.
43 See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 70.
44 See KARL MARX FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE CONIMUNIST MANIFESTO 79 (Samuel Moore
Penguin Books 1985) (1848).
45 See RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 120 (predicting that America will soon see a war between
blacks and whites); Bell, Interest-Convergence, supra note 33, at 22 (arguing that whites only
support racial equality when it serves their "interests" to do so).
46 See, e.g., 'Mum, supra note 30; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
47 Cf. Charles Abernathy, Advocacy Scholarship and Affirmative Action, 86 CEO. L.J. '377,
384-93 (1997) (book review) (characterizing Matsuda and Lawrence's work as "advocacy schol-
arship" which "overstates the case, dehumanizes the opposition, and tturns off as many readers
as it may convert"); see also supra note 17.
40 See Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAN!). L.
REV. 665,674 (1903).
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objective evaluation.° For example, Derrick Bell, a pre-eminent race-
crit, insists that "abstraction, put forth as 'rational' or 'objective' truth,
smuggles the privileged choice of the privileged [i.e., whites] to deper-
soiiify their claims and then pass them off as the universal authority
and the universal good,'tt In other Words, mainstream truths dominate
legal discourse not because they are better than other truths, but
because groups in power espouse .' them. 51 Charles Lawrence urges
"outsiders" (i.e., minorities) to free themselves from the "mystification"
produced by the "ideology" of objective truth: "We must learn to trust
our own senses, feelings, and experiences, and to give them authority,
even (or especially) in the face of dominant accounts of social reality
that claim universality."" According to the race-crits, knowledge is not
universal;" it is autobiographical and group-based. 51
49 See. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern
Constitutional Traditionalisni, HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 57, 59-61 (1995) (describing CRT's post-
modernist stance); see also WORDS THAT WOUND, Supra note 7, at 3 ("Critical race theorists
embrace subjectivity of and are avowedly political"). Angela Harris defines postmod-
ernism as - the belief that "knowledge, truth, objectivity, and reason are actually merely the effects
of a particular form of social power, the victory of a particular way of representing the world: ...."
Harris, supra note 11, at 748. A less sympathetic. observer has defined it:
Postmodernism is the degenerate egalitarianism of the intelligentsia. It launches a
non sequitur from a truism, The truism is that because our knowledge of facts is
conditioned in complex ways by the contexts in which facts are encountered, the
acquisition of knowledge is not simple, immediate and infallible, The non sequitur:
therefore all assertions are equally indeterminate—and equally respectable. All
ascriptions of truth are arbitrary, so there are no standards of intellectual consci-
entiousness. So whoever has power shall decree the truth.
George F. Will, Torricelli's Larger Point, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1997, at 78.
The race-crits' adherence to postmodernism:may be merely opportunistic. Richard Delgado,
for example, announces the end of "linear thought" in one article, yet as the editor of a CRT
compilation he included a survey of empirical studies of white juror bias against black defendants.
Compare Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 17, at 346, with Cheri
Lynn Johnson, Mach Innocence and the White Jury, in CUTTING EDGE, supra note 17,: at 180..
"Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL L. Ray, 893, 901 [herein-
after Bell, Who's Afraid?], This assertion mirrors the claims of radical, or "third-wave," feminists
that "objective reality is a myth," imposed by males to legitimate their domination of women. See
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373, 1378 (1986).
51 See Bell, Who's Afraid?, supra note 50, at 901.
52 Lawrence, Word & River; ,supra note 10, at 338:
53 See KEY WRITINGS, .supra note 9, at xiii (claiming that critical race theory rejects objectivity
and seeks to "create new, oppositionist accounts of race").
54 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 18, at 80-81 (showing how critical race theory judges
scholarship based on, how it:represents "the distinctive experience" of minority groups and on its
capacity for "community building" within that group); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography
and Legal Scholarship and Teaching; Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539,
540-43 (1991) (arguing that black scholars have a particular need to justify their beliefs based
on anecdote and autobiography, because "rwlhoWe are matters as much as what we are and what
we think"). Many critical race theorists adhere to the idea of a distinctive "voice of color" that is
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By discarding the processes of objectivity and rational empiricism,
race-crits clear the ground for their idea that a person's position on
the racial totem pole controls his or her fate to the exclusion of all
else. Under this worldview, minorities today are faring little better than
they were before segregation was declared unconstitutional." Accord
ing to Bell, many black people are "more deeply mired in poverty and
despair than they were during the 'Separate but Equal' era."" Indeed,
he claims, the lives of some people of color are "little less circumscribed
than were those of their slave forbears." 57 Bell furtherargues that even
those blacks in the middle class have "seen their progress halted and
many are sliding back toward the low income status they worked so
hard to escape."58
 RiChard Delgado, one of the most prolific critical
race theorists, asserts that those blacks who make it to the middle class
are worse off than those who live in low-income, all-black communities
because they are more likely to come in contact with whites, and
therefore, racism." And Regina Austin argues that the "ideology of
individual black advancement" is "but a veneer, unraveling in the face
of collective lower-class decline.'"
Because evidence plays little role in the race-crits' description of
black disadvantage, they feel no need to explain the economic and
political progress of black Americans during the last thirty years.°'
Postmodern subjectivism allows race-crits to dismiss inconvenient facts
supposedly representative of the minority community. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 18, at
80-81. As Alex Johnson puts it, the 'Voice of Color is about illuminating the unique insights that
come from the duality inherent in the existence of any person of color who resides in the United
States." Alex Johnson, Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color:
Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L,. REV. 803, 845 (1994)
(emphasis added). This "voice of color" seems unable to speak about anything but racial issues.
See id. at 835-37. It is also apparently a left-Iving voice. John 0. Calmore contends that blacks
who join the "ideological right wing" are "prone to suffer a race-image anxiety," implying that
"authentic" intellectuals of color cannot be conservative. See John 0. Calmore, Critical Race
Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural
World, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 326. Minorities who dare question the alleged opinions
of their group are condemned as traitors to their race. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 18, at
80 (discussing harsh reaction to black scholar Randall Kennedy's critique of CRT). Not all
race-crits adhere to the "voice of color" argument, however. Paul Butler, for example, argues that
"truce is a troubling and usually inaccurate proxy for perspective." Paul Butler, Affirmative Action
and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COL°. L. REV. 841, 852 (1997) [hereinafter Butler, Affirmative Action].
55 See Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 374.
58 Id, This sweeping claim is undocumented.
57 DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 4 (1987).
58 Bell, Who's Afraid?, supra note 50, at 903.
t' °` See RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 31 n.98.
6° Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, in
CurriNG EDGE, ROM note 17; at 293, 295.
81 See, e.g., PATTERsotv, supra note 23, at 17-27.
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as suspect if they appear to support the "dominant" perspective. 62 Thus,
Derrick Bell dismisses all criticism of CRT by whites as "a pathetically
poor effort to regain a position of dominance:" He encourages race-
crits, when criticized, to "consider the source. As to a response, a sad
smile of sympathy may suffice."'"'Black scholars like Randall Kennedy,
who dare dispute CRT's assertions, arc tarred with an academic version
of the "Uncle Tom" epithet." For example, Paul Butter dismissed
criticism of his call for race-based jury nullification with the insulting
allegation that his critic (Kennedy) simply wanted to be an "honorary
white.""
Instead of civil discourse, race-crits substitute subjective, personal
and even fictitious "narratives" as evidence of the permanence and
prevalence of racism." Public discourse, to race-crits, is just a clash of
different "stories:" Indeed, "'rationalism' is itself, just a particular kind
of story"" which can be contradicted with non-rational "countersto-
ries."7" Unlike empirical research, however, the meaning, accuracy or
representativeness of a personal story cannot be cfuestioned without
attacking the storyteller's identity, thereby confirming the critic's hos-
tility to the victims of racism." Questioning the race-crits' grip on
reality, then, is not just disrespectful, it is oppressive. 72
112 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra Dole 18, at 137: see also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mien. L. Riw. 2111, 2421 (1989) [hereinafter
Delgado, Plea] (describing all denials of racism as "stock stories" that "justify the world as it is").
"Bell, Who's Afraid?, .supra note 50, at 910,
64 Id.
65 See Richard Delgado, Mindset and Aletaphor; 103 HARv. L. REv. 1872, 1873-74 (1990)
(implying that Randall Kennedy, in criticizing mu' claims of racism in the legal academy, simply
sought to help "the empowered remain empowered" and "[tender] the disempowered ... even
more so").
rPli See Patti Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of RACE, CRIME, AND TilE LAW, I 1 1 HARv.
L. REV, 1270, 1287 (1998) (book review).
67 See, e.g, PATRICIA J, WILLIAMS, TOE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIODTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 44-51 (1991) (telling autobiographical story Of being turned away front a Benetton
store by a sales clerk, probably out or racial bigotry, and Wiwi-1'1cm hostility of legal academicians
to her telling the story in a law review). See generally Delgado, Plea, supra note 62 (advocating
legal storytelling in place of doctrinal analysis).
68 See Delgado, Plea, supra note 62, at 2412 (describing debate over faculty lilting at law
school as a clash of "dominant group" and "outgroup" stories).
6g Harris, supra note 11, at 757.
76 See Delgado, Plea, supra note 62, at 2414-15.
71 See, e.g., FARBER & SIIERRY, supra note 18, 01 90-94 (describing ethnic rancor between two
scholars, Gary Feller and Mark Toslutet, in interpreting a story by Patricia Williams).
72 Even friendiy critiques of CRT narratives are subject to ad hotninem attack. See, e.g.,
Richard Delgado, Coughlin's Complaint: Now to Disparage Outsider Writing, One Year Later, 821'A.
L. REV. 95, 107 (1996) (accusing Professor Anne Coughlin, who interpreted CRT narratives, of
"replicating the sill of the slave master" who wrote "ruthlessly reductive" accounts of his slaves).
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Critical race narratives cover a range of different scenarios. Some
record fictional conversations between blacks who share the CRT per-
spective." Others propound hypotheticals that reflect the race-crits'
pessimism about race in the United States. 74 For example, in Derrick
Bell's influential narrative "The Space Traders,"" space aliens land in
New Jersey in the year 2000 and offer to trade gold, technology and
other untold treasure in return for all the nation's black citizens, who
are to be taken away in the visitors' spaceships." According to Bell's
fiction, white America overwhelmingly accepts the deal," the Supreme
Court finds it constitutional" and the country's African Americans are
taken away in chains, "as their forbears had arrived.""
In sum, the race-wits' conception of race relations in America is
profoundly pessimistic. 8° Because the race-crits paint such a bleak pic-
ture, they rarely suggest strategies for overcoming white racial bigotry.
Racism, to race-crits, is all-pervasive and all-controlling; nothing can
be done. Accordingly, Derrick Bell has no difficulty making the sweep-
ing claim that
[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country.
Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will pro-
duce no more than temporary "peaks of progress," short-lived
victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in
ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept
fact that all history verifies. 8 '
73 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT-THE Borrost OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
15-31 (1992) [hereinafter FACES) (fictional conversation between black professor and black taxi
driver who views emancipation, integration and the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday as nothing
more than "symbols" which "the Man" uses to pacify minorities). See generally RODRIGO CHRON-
ICLES, SUp/11 note 6 (collection of fictional conversations between radical black student and
"professor" espousing race-crit arguments).
71 See, e.g., RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 120 (describing conservative attacks on welfare and
affirmative action as deliberate efforts to increase minority misery in hopes of provoking a race
war, which could then he used to justify still more coercive ineastires); Derrick Bell, The Space
Traders, in FACES, supra note 73, at 158-94 (hereinafter Bell, Space Traders].
75 See Bell, Space Traders, supra note 74, at 158-94.
76 See id. at 159.
77 See id. at 192.
78 See id. at 191.
79
 Id. at 194.
8° See supra notes 36-79 and accompanying text.
51 See Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 373.
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2. Racism and the Rule of Law
After asserting the ubiquity of racial "subordination" in American
society, race-cri ts assert that law is dot the solution—it is part of the
problem." The American legal system, they argue, is structurally inca-
pable of achieving racial equality because law is essentially politics,"
and politics is white supremacy.m. Neither laws nor judicial decisions
can rest, as Herbert Wechsler said they must, "on reasons quite tran-
scending the immediate result that is achieved,"" because white law-
makers cannot transcend their subconscious racism."' To the race-crits,
the hard-won protections of civil rights law, so dear to integrationists
like Thurgood Marshall," serve primarily to deflect calls for more
radical change, thereby preserving the racial status quo. 88 As a result,
"abstract principles," such as racial equality, can only "lead to legal
results that harm blacks and perpetuate their inferior status." 89
Race-crits sometimes refer to this as a "realist" interpretation of
law, in the tradition of American legal realism." The legal realism
movement, prominent in law schools between the late 1920s and early
1950s, attacked the formalistic notion that legal rules, if applied faith-
82 See Kay WRITINGS„Ttpn note 9, at xxv (stating Mal the law 'constructed race" and re-
produces "the structures and practices of racial dontination").
R9
	 Harris, supra now II, at 747. Muck worthwhile Legal scholarship, of course, is devoted
to "debunking" the notion that the law is entirely separate from politics. For many historians and
political scientists, a case like Marko. v Madison is more interesting Ibr what it illuminates about
the politics of judicial decision making than for the doctrine it produced. 5 U.S. (1 Crotch) 137
(1803). To them, it is sufficient to know ilast Marbury was a game of legal chicken in which Chid'
justice Marshall blinked first, but with brilliance, allowing JO ferson to will the battle over Mar-
bury's commission but winning total victory for American courts in the war for judicial review.
See, e.g., RoBERT McCLosice, 'DIE AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT 25-28 (2d, ed. 1994). Marshall
behaved badly, failing to consider the Court's jurisdiction befbre proceeding to the merits of the
case, sitting when he should have recused himself, twisting the law of contracts to find that
Marhury's right had vested the moment the wax dried on Ins commission, then willfully misread-
ing the Judiciary Act to find it in conflict with the Constitution. See William Vml Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE U. 1,6-10. The debunkers are right, of - course—judicial
review did have a bastard birth. See id. But that does not discredit the doctrine, without which
constitutional government as we know it would not have been possible. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1,18 (1958) (calling judicial review a "permanem and indispensable feature of our consti-
tutional system").
84 See supra nrucs 36-79 and accompanying text.
85 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV, L. Rtw. 1,15
(1959).
"See RoatRIG0 CHRONICLES, supra note 6, at 63.
87 See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, TUURGooD tvIARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998).
88 See RouRico CHRONICLES, SUptyz note 6, at 67.
89 Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 369.
141 See id. at 364-68 (thawing comparison between legal realism and his own form of "racial
realism"); Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 54, at 876 (describing himself as "legal realist").
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fully, would produce predictable outcomes in most situations. 91 Critical
race theory's links to this body of scholarship, however, are super-
ficial—the only real similarity between CRT and legal realism is that
both theories are hostile to rigid formalism.92
 Unlike race-crits, the
legal realists did not "deconstruct" law and leave nothing in the void.
Some used empirical research about social conditions to inform legal
rules,93
 while others focused their efforts on making legal scholarship
more reflective of legal reality. 94
Critical race theory more properly traces its lineage to the black
liberationist movement of the 1960s95
 and the Critical Legal Studies
("CLS") movement of the 1970s and 1980s.96 Critical legal scholars,
whose ranks included a number of neo-Marxist intellectuals, former
New Left activists and ex-counter-culturalists, 97
 insisted that law is not
only politically and culturally contingent, as the realists demonstrated,
but is an instrument of power whose chief function and effect is to
reinforce societal disadvantage. 98. According to Duncan Kennedy,"
methods of legal reasoning "are only argumentative techniques," not
ways of determining which legal outcomes are more legitimate than
others.'"" Law is "indeterminate,"'"' and there is "never a 'correct legal
91 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Comm. L.
REV. 809 (1935); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic finisprudtmce—The Next Step, 30 Cows'. L. REV. 431
(1930). For a good history of the movement, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE 1927-1960 (1986); see also FARBER & SHERRY, s u/n note 18, at 17-19.
92 The same could he said of liberalism. See infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
93 See KALNIAN, supra note 91, at 45. Some legal realists of this bent became functionaries in
the New Deal. See id. at 130-44.
9-1 See id. at 26.
	 •
95 See, e.g., RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 47 (suggesting minorities should view law as Black
Panthers did); Gary Pellet; Race Consciousness, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 127 (arguing
that black nationalism is a useful guide for civil rights reform).
94' See, e.g., CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES James Boyle ed., 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan
C. Hutchinson ed„ 1980); DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983) [hereinafter REPRODUCTION OF HIERAR-
CIIY]; ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). For good criticism of
the movement, see generally ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAI: LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE
(1990); David Andrew Price, Tatting Rights Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies, 48
CAMBRIDGE U. 271 (1989).
97 See KEY WRITINGS, septa note 9, at xvii.
98 See, e.g., David Kai•ys, introduction 10 THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE OtrriquE 7
(rev. ed. 1992) [hereinafte• Po•rics OF LAW] (stating that law "is a major vehicle for the
maintenance of existing social and power relations by the consent or acquiescence of the lower
and middle classes").
99 Not to be confused with Randall Kennedy, an African-American liberal and CRT critic.
IN See REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY, supra note 96, at 20 (emphasis in original).
1 "I See generally Joseph William Singer; The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE Li. 1 (1984) (defending CLS "indeterminacy thesis").
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solution' that is other than the correct ethical and political solution to
[a] legal problem."m Or, as Elizabeth Mensch put it, "law is politics."
Despite their expressed affinity for the disadvantaged, critical legal
scholars focused most of their criticism against liberal legal theories,
not conservative political or legal thought. 1 °" In particular, they at-
tacked liberalism's devotion to individual rights for preventing the
cultivation of group rights. 105 Roberto linger, for example, objected to
traditional property rights because they protect social hierarchy at the
expense of "communal life." 1 "'" Similarly, Duncan Kennedy asserted
that "the 'freedom' of individualism is negative, alienated, and arbi-
trary. . .. We can achieve real freedom only collectively, through group
self-determination," which, he admits, "implies the use of force against
the individual."107 In short, as CLS critic David ,Price explains, the
movement's platform was one of "imposed community," a concept
antithetical to the liberal goal of ordered liberty.
A number of nascent critical race theorists, frustrated with liber-
alism and sympathetic to CLS's group-rights orientation, joined the
movement in the early 1980s, only to split off in 1989 because that
predominately white movement did not address racism to their satis-
faction.'" The newly-organized splinter group insisted that race was the
real cause of disadvantage in society, and charged that the critical legal
studies movement, for all its debunking of liberalism, did little to
102 REPRODUCTION OF HIERARcov, supra note 96, at 20.
l" Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in Pourics or 1..Av„typta
note 98, at 13, 33.
104 See generally POLITICS or	 supra note 98.
11/11 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 l'IARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rat 393 (1988); Mark Tusli net,
An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. RE.v. 1363, 1363-64 (1984).
"See UNGER, Supra note 06, at 36.
"Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 l'IARV. L. Ray. 1685,
1774 (1076) (emphasis in original). Similarly, Roberto Unger has expressed sympathy' for smite
of the most savage elements of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, including Maoist "criticism and
self-criticism" sessions, See William Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, 07 YALE L.J.
665, 743-44, 746 (1988) (stating that in Unger's view, "[title trouble with the Cultural Revolution
is not that it was a moral and economic disaster ... but that it was 'truncated,' that it challenged
too little of the 'established structure of social life'--not that it went too far , hill that it dill riot
go far enough").
109 See Price, supra now 96, al 300-01.
1419 See Kay WRITINGS, supra note 9, at xxii--7xxvii; Richard Delgado, Legal Scholarship: In.
siders, Outsiders, Editors, 63 U. Cow. L. Rm.'. 717, 721 (1992). In 1987, the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review dedicated an entire issue to the grienmces of minority scholars
with critical legal studies. See Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HAM'.
C.R..C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987) [hereinafter Minority Critiques]. In August, 1989, thirty such scholars
met at a conference in Madison, Wisconsin, where they inaugurated "critical race theory." See
supra note 11, at 741.
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address the problems of minorities."° The "critical race theorists,"
however, retained the critical legal scholars' belief in legal indetermi- .
nacy and remained indebted to their combination of legal realism,
postmodernism and group-rights theory. ill
The race-crits continued CLS's attack on the liberal faith in neu-
tral principles of law, not because neutrality is an impossible dream,
but because neutral principles were allegedly used by conservatives to
cut bad( on benefits that white Democrats had doled out in more
liberal times."' To the race-crits' dismay, the sword of equal protection,
once used to strike clown discrimination and disadvantage, was sud-
denly being wielded against black university applicants," 3 black mem-
bers of Congress," 4 and black would-be government contractors. 115
Liberals also objected to some of these developments, and worked to
develop theories that would exempt benign racial classification from
strict. Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny." 6 But the race-cuts went fur-
ther. As soon as allegedly neutral principles of civil rights were asserted
on behalf of whites, the race-crits attacked the very idea that law could,
or should, be racially or ethnically neutral."'
Part of this effort included revisionist legal history. Derrick Bell,
in an early article, claimed that the civil rights victories in Brown v.
Board of Education," 8 Cooper v. Aaron'' and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
bare° were not decided on principles of equality, but because whites
(who are all alike) had a political and economic "interest" in striking
down de jure segregation.' 2 ' This interest included a better ability to
fight the Cold War, pacification of radical blacks like Paul Robeson,
See generally Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 limtv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987) [hereinafter Delgado, Ethereal Scholar].
III See Harris, supra note 11, at 745-50;
112 See. KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at xxviii (stating that current U.S. Supreme Court "has
effectively conscripted liberal theories of race and racism to wage a conservative attack on
governmental efforts to address the persistence of societal-wide discrimination").
" 3 See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111 SeeBush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
115 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. Crown,
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
1111 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L.
REV, 87 (1979).
117 See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at xiii ("Critical Race Theory ...I -ejects the prevailing
orthodoxy that scholarship should be or could he 'neutral' and 'objective.'").
118 347 U.S. 483 (1954):
119 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
120 402 U.S. 1 (1976).
121 See Bell, Interest-Convergence, supra note 33, at 22-23.
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and encouragement of economic development in the South. 122 The
Supreme Court decisions of the late 1970s and 1980s that restricted
all action, Bell said, proved that this racial interest had
ended,'" not, as is commonly believed, that conservative Republicans
had on the power to appoint conservative judges. Therefore, the only
"neutral principle" that Bell saw in civil rights law was that It] he
interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated
only when it converges with the interests of whites." 124 Articles by other
race-crits have sought to refine and support this "interest-convergence
thesis." 12"
Critical race theorists also attacked mainstream legal scholarship
for its alleged racial bias.' 2" In 1984, Richard Delgado castigated the
most prominent white civil rights scholars, including John Hart Ely,
Owen Fiss, Kent Greenawalt and Laurence Tribe for "only infrequently
citing] a minority scholar."' 27 This amounted to "imperial scholar-
ship," he said, by academic whites who wish to "remain in contror of
civil rights law.' 28 These white scholars, Delgado claimed, are not prin-
cipled thinkers, but defenders of a racial status quo who stress proce-
dure over substance in order to assure that whatever change occurs
does not happen "too fast." 129 The whites' tendency to defend affirma-
tive action as a socially useful mechanism For aiding the disadvantaged
rather than as a racial reparations program, Delgado said, only con-
122 See id. at 23,
123 See id. at 23-24.
124 Id. at 22. This argument is a carbon copy of Stokely Carmichael's dismissal of coalition-
building between whites and blacks, See CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 12, at 75 ("We ...
believe that political relations are based on self-interest: benefits to be gained and losses to be
avoided.").
125 See, e.g., Mary L. Dtidziak, Desegirriion as a Cold War Imperative, in CUTTING EDGE, SI/pEn
note 17, at 110-21.
' 26 See, e.g, Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DUKE Li. 39, 41 ("Legal scholarship remains one of the last vestiges of white
supremacy in civilized intellectual circles."); Jerome McCristal Culp,k, Posner on Duncan Kennedy
and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 Dula? Li. 1095, 1096-97 (1992)
(alleging that an article by Judge Richard Posner defending neutral, objective standaids of
judging scholarship exemplifies "white supremacy" because it serves "white majority" interests in
legal academia). See generally Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of
Civil Rights Literature, in Key WRITINGS, 31/pro note 9, at 46 [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial
Scholar] (criticizing white civil rights scholars for failing to cite minority scholars).
' 27 See Delgado, Imperial Scholar; supra note 126, at 47; see also Delgado, The Imperial Scholar
Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later; 140 U. PA. L. RF.v. 1319 (1992)
(complaining !hat critical race theory and radical feminism are not taken seriously in legal
academia).
'28 See Delgado, Imperial Scholar, supra note 126, at 5 I, 52.
'29 See id. at 52-53.
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firms the scholars' racial bias.' 3° Civil rights litigation and writing,
Delgado proclaimed, should be the exclusive domain of minority at-
torneys and scholars."' "The time has come for white liberal authors
who write in the field of civil rights to redirect their efforts . . ." 132
"The day of the minstrel show is, indeed, over." 133
Race-crits also examine "how traditional [legal] interests and val-
ues serve as vessels of racial subordination." 134 According to the race-
crits, one such "vessel" is the liberal theory of the First Amendment,
which, by protecting what Justice Holmes called "freedom for the
thought that we hate," 135 only protects racists.' 36 The expression of
racially hateful ideas, in their view, is not speech, but "conduct" which
"constructs the social reality that constrains the liberty of non-whites
because of their race."' 37 First Amendment law, which once shielded
civil rights activists against Southern racists, 138 is now a "deeply mis-
taken" example of "neutrality-based jurisprudence" which "assure [s]
that life's victors continue winning."'" Hate speech, the race-crits insist,
should not be constitutionally protected because it is "a central weapon
in the struggle by the empowered to maintain [white privilege] in the
face of formerly subjugated groups . . ..""p
Another frequent target of the race-crits is the concept of "merit,"
which many conservatives have invoked in attacking affirmative action
programs in higher education."' Grades and scores on standardized
tests, the race-crits say, are not objective, neutral measuring rods of
19° See id. at 50.
I:11 See id. at 52-53.
' 52 1d. at 53.
1 " Delgado, Imperial Scholar; sitpra note 126, at 53.
134 11'oRns TilAT WOUND, supra Dole 7, at 6.
135
 United Slates v. Sch•immer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136 See, e.g., MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 15; WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7;
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 HARv, C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Tort Action]. Repression of right-
wing speech' is not a new idea among academic leftists. See, e.g., Herbert Marcuse, Repressive
Tolerance, in ROBERT PAUL WOLFF ET AL., A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (1965).
• 137 CI iarles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Hint Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in WORDS
THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 53, 62 (hereinafter Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech].
0.8 See, e.g., Shuulesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
556 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
139 RACE WAR, supra II Ole 9, at 67.
1411 MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 15, at 161.
141 See, e.g., DulEstt D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPUS 24-58 (1991); THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 30, at 348-85; Direst] D'Souza,
Sins of Admission, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE
POLITICS OF INCLUSION 230-36 (Nicolas Mills ed., 1994).
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talent and ability, but just another culturally- and racially-contingent
means by which whites replicate their own hegemony."' According to
Delgado, attempts to select applicants according to their academic
skills or accomplishments amount to nothing more than "affirmative
action for whites."'" To argue otherwise is not just wrong, but "deeply
racist."'• Similarly, Paul Butler insists that the concepts of "demerit"
which underlie the criminal law are arbitrary and racist, as evidenced
by the disproportionate numbers of black men in prison."'
In sum, the dominant descriptive theme of CRT is that American
society and law .are controlled by an overarching, all-controlling white
racism that ensures the continued oppression of racial minorities, even
as the law officially rejects racial classifications.'" Thus, some race-crits
suggest radical measures to mitigate the harms of America's allegedly
ubiquitous caste system . 147
B. Normative Elements
The avowed goal of CRT is to "eliminat[e] racial oppression" and
to achieve "fundamental social transformation."'" This is to be done,
says Charles Lawrence, by evaluating "work product (judicial opinions,
legislation, organizing tactics, ideas, theory, poetry) according to the
degree to which the effort serves the cause of liberation."'" Evenhand-
edness is unimportant—law is only a tool to be "manipulated" on
behalf of minorities. 15" What best serves the cause of "liberation" is not
always clear, but most CRT proposals fall into one of three categories:
result-oriented modification of legal doctrine,'" substitution of group
rights for individual rightsm and outsider "resistance."'"
142 See RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 6, at 72; see alsoDaria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the
Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 10 Ln RAZA Li. 363 (1998).
14 :1 See RODRIGO CHRONICLES, 51/pin note 6, at 72.
144 See RACE WAR, SUPM note 9, at 95.
"5 See Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 54, at 8(18.
146 Sr, SUAra notes 36-145 and accompanying text.
147 See infra notes 148-204 and accompanying text.
145 See WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 6-7.
149 L-twrence, Word & Rive); supra note 10, at 340.
"0 ,See Freeman, supra note 17, at 458-59.
IN See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text.
I "See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
See. infra notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
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1. Result-Oriented Legal Change
Some race-crits • advocate result-oriented modification of estab-
lished legal doctrine to improve the plight of minorities.' 54 The race
crits' deconstruction of neutral principles, stare decisis and neutrality
makes this effort uncomplicated—they . simply demand better "re-
sults"'" for those "at the bottom," 3 "i° period. This command basically
means that certain issues and parties should be exempted from the
ordinary application of the laws.' 57
For example, many race-crits argue that "hate speech" should not
be protected by the First Amendment.'" Like the radical feminists
Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,m some race-crits believe
that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality should over-
ride the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech to allow the
censorship of bigoted expression.'" Others would treat the utterance
of a racial epithet as an intentional tort,' 61 or as low value speech easily
outweighed by the government's interest in protecting minority sensi-
bilities.'''= The race-crits, however, would not censor all hate-mongers
equally.'" Mari Matsuda believes that "[h]ateful verbal attacks upon
dominant-group members by victims," 164 though "condemnable both
politically and personally,"'" should be legally "permissible" 66 because
154 See generally WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7.
155 See Freeman, supra note 17, at 458-59 (stating that Derrick Bell judges legal doctrine by
its "results" alone).
156 Cf. Matsuda, supra note 9, at 63 (arguing that victims of discrimination in United States
should be source of normative legal discourse).
157 See, e.g., Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 54, at 844 (proposing that black people
never be sentenced to death for killing whites); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech,
in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 7, at 17-51 [hereinafter Matsuda, Public Response] (arguing
that hate speech against oppressed minorities should iiot be protected under First Amendment).
158 See generallyWoRus THAT WOUND, supra note 7. For good criticism of the CRT hate speech
argument, see Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 37; Gey,
MOM note 18, at 193; Madorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Wound," 18
HARM. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 (1983).
159 See generally IN HARM'S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS (Catharine
MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997) (testimony of radical feminists before various legisla-
tures advocating censorship of pornography); CATHARINE. 14IACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71-110
(1993) (arguing that First Amendment protection of pornography and hate speech is inconsistent
with equality under the Fourteenth Amendment).
10 See Lawrence, Regulating Racist Speech, supra note 137, at 59.
' 61 See generally Delgado, Tort Action, supra note 136, at 133.
162 See MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 15, at x.
153 See Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 157, at 36.
164
155 1d. at 39.
16° See id. at 36.
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such attacks "are not tied to the structural domination of another
group."' 57 The ancient principle that laws should be of general appli-
cation is less important to race-crits than silencing white racist speech,
and thereby, according to Delgado, changing how racists think.'" The
race-crits show no concerti for where such precedents might lead"''.'
because their result-oriented postmodernism reduces all law to politics
and dismisses legal precedent as worthless.'"
Another common focus of criticism is the U.S. Supreme Court's
1976 ruling in Washington v. Davism that state laws with no discrimi-
natory purpose do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment simply because they happen to have a racially
disproportionate impact. 172 Race-crits argue that because racism works
unconsciously, courts can never know if' the purpose behind a given
law is racist.'" Accordingly, judges should not question whether the
perpetrator had racist motives, but should focus only on the harm
clone to the alleged victim.' 74 That approach, as justice White observed
in his opinion for the Court in Davis, could "invalidate a whole range
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than
to the more affluent white."'m Such .a result., however, is acceptable to
the race-cuts, even if it nullifies many well-intentioned, 17" democrati-
167 1d. at 39.
168 See Delgado, Tort Action, supra note 136, at 149.
11'9 Mini Matsuda, for example, does not worry that regulating hate speech might set a
precedent for suppression of other unpopular ideas, such as Marxism. See Matsuda, Public
Response, supra note 157, at 37. Communism, she declares, is not "universally condemned," while
the "doctrine of racial stiperiority" is. See id. Similarly, Richard Delgaclo thinks the fear that
campus Irate - speech rules would lead to more widespread repression is purely hypothetical, See
Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 110 U. PA.
L. Rev. 865, 873-74 (1998).
1711 See Bell, Who's Afraid?, supra note 50, at 900 (quoting with approval CIS writer Stanley
Fish's view of precedent as "a ramshackle ad hoc affair whose ill-fitting joints are soldered together
by suspect rhetorical gestures, kaps of illogic, and special pleading tricked up as general rules,
all in the service ola decidedly partisan agenda that wants to wrap itself in the mantle and ni a jesly
of the law" (quoting STANLEY E. FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As Fat:I:SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
MING, Too 21 (1994)).
171 426 U.S. 229 (197(i).
172 See id. at 247-48.
1 711 See Lawrence, Id, Ego, supra note 90, at 237.
174 See RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 21-22.
175 426 U.S. at 248.
170 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1143-46 (1998) (arguing that the Equal
Protection Clause should he construed to require heightened judicial scrutiny of facially neutral
laws, regardless of their intent, that "significantly contribute() to ... race and gender st•atifica-
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cally-enacted laws. Democracy, like law, is of less concern to the race-
crits than advancing their group's interests.'"
2. Group Rights
Some race-crits would substitute group rights for the individual
liberties shielded by the liberal tradition.' 78 In shifting the paradigm to
group rights, race-crits seek to avoid the common objection that race-
based remedies are unfair to individuals. For example, Mari Matsuda
believes that the victims of racism should be able to sue both the
"perpetrator descendants and current beneficiaries of past injustice"
for reparations.'" Because all whites "continue to benefit from the
wrongs of the past and the presumptions of inferiority imposed upon
victims," she reasons, they should be "taxed" (apparently by a court)
for the sins of their race, even if they and their ancestors had nothing
to do with racial oppression.' 8° Because the rights of white people are
defined by the relative position of their group, she implies, individual
fairness is unimportant.' 8 '
The group rights, model also serves as the basis for the race-crits'
calls For more affirmative action. 182 In a particularly stark example, Paul
Butler has suggested that "affirmative action" should be applied to
criminal law to reduce the disparate percentages of blacks and whites
in the prison population.'" Most African Americans are in prison,
Butler says, because "white people have driven them there." 184 There-
fore, he argues, either more blacks should be freed or more whites
imprisoned as reparations for white supremacy and to achieve "diver-
sity" in American prisons.' 85
tion," including domestic violence laws, the "war on drugs," zoning regulations, sexual assault
laws and welfare).
177 See RODRIGO CI IRON ICLES, supra note 6, at 141 (arguing that democracy is the "source of
black people's subordination").
178
 See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 75.
179 Id. at 70.
In Id. at 70, 71.
181 See id.
182 See Delgado, Imperial Scholar; supra note 126, at 50 (arguing that reparations rationale is
only just basis for affirmative action).
183 See Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 54.
1 E4 Id. at 844.
185 See id. at 866 n.164.
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3. "Resistance"
For all their talk of "realism,"'" race-crits are strangely unrealistic
in their proposals for reform. 1 m 7 Most probably realize that radical
measures like racial or ethnic reparations are not likely to be granted,
especially by a court. But even unrealistic proposals are rare, because
race-crits generally prefer not to suggest solutions, but to "resist" the
dominant legal thought, doctrine and policy, whatever that happens
to be.'" As Derrick Bell has put it, "most critical race theorists are
committed to a program of scholarly resistance, and most hope schol-
arly resistance will lay the groundwork for wide-scale resistance."'" How
this ivory tower oppositionalism would foment grassroots revolt is un-
clear, because CRT professors rarely suggest anything practical. Rather,
their exhortations are meant, as Bell says, to "harass white folks" and •
thereby "make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent,
subordinate class."'"
One of the race-erns' few practical programs of "resistance" is Paul
Butler's proposal that inner-city juries practice racially-based jury nul-
lification.' 91 jurors of color, Butler argues, have the "moral responsibil-
ity" not to apply the criminal law to blacks and whites equally, but to
"etnancipate some guilty black outlaws" because "the black commu-
nity" would be "better off" if there were fewer black men in prison.'" If
enough juries were hung or not-guilty verdicts rendered, he imagines,
the white-dominated government would change its excessive reliance
on incarceration.'" Butler rejects the ordinary democratic process of
legal reform.' Democracy, he says, ensures a "permanent, homoge-
nous majority" of whites that "dominat[es]" African Ainericans.w 5 But-
ler is probably correct that occasional acts of jury nullification might
well express the resentment that many African Americans justifiably
feel towards discriminatory law enforcement.'"`' As Randall Kennedy
186 See Bell, Realism, supra note 4.
IV See, e.g., RooRulo Clutoracms, supra note G, at 158, 150 (suggesting that if Americans
abandoned their ttse of "color imagery" on television and in conversation, and substituted the
metaphor of "torch," they could "leant to ling the world, including the dark people in it ....").
188 See Bell, 1Vho's Afraidt, supra note 50, at 000.
1 " Id.
11mBell, Realism, supra tote 4, at 377, 370.
1• See Btuler, Black Power; supra note 14.
152 See id. at 679.
I" See id. at 723-25.
154 See id. at 711-12.
195 See id.
1911 Sre RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 25-27 (1007) (noting lack or fa ith
among black,Americaus that law enforcement is impartial).
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has pointed out, however, black Americans are disproportionately the
victims of crimes,' 97
 and therefore tend to favor more, not less, criminal
prosecution and punishment. 1 "8
The race-crits' preference for "resistance"' 99 over democratic par-
ticipation seems to flow from a fear of losing their status as "opposi-
tional scholars] "200
 to the game of mainstream law and politics, which
they regard as "an inevitably co-optive process?"' Better to be radically
opposed to the "doniinant political discourse""2 and remain an out
 than to work within the current system and lose one's "authen-
ticity?" In rejecting the realistic for the "authentic," however, race-crits
begin to look like academic poseurs—ideological purists striking the
correct radical stance, but doing little within the confines of the real
world, so sure are they that nothing much can he done."
II. CRI'I'ICAL RACE THEORY'S CHALLENGE TO THE LIBERAL LEGAL
SYSTEM
Any jackass can kick down a barn—bat it takes a real carpenter
to build one.
—Sam Rayburn"
The race-crits' fatalistic description of race and law in the United
States places them far outside the liberal tradition in America." In
their cynicism, they insist that our legal system is beyond redemption,
that whites are irredeemably racist and that the principles of the liberal
legal system are false promises."' In short, they reduce law to politics
127 See id. at 11 (noting that black Americans of nearly all income brackets are more likely
to be victims of crime than are whites).
108 See id. at 305-06 (noting that in a 1993 Gallup poll, 82% of blacks surveyed said that
courts in their area do not treat criminals harshly enough. Seventy-live percent favored putting
more police on streets and 68% favored building more prisons so that longer sentences could
be imposed).
19° See Bell, 41,9,o's Afraid?, supra note 50, at 900.
2U° Set CalillOre, supra note 54, at 318.
201 See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, supra note 33, at 119.
202 See id.
'20 See generally Calmore, supra note 54.
2114 See Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 373. The same criticism has been leveled at the critical
legal studies movement. See Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 264 (1984) (arguing that CIS movement allows "a few harmless academic leftists to
adopt a radical pose, while receiving good salaries and excellent fringe benefits . . .").
205 Sam Rayburn, quoted in Remarks by Congressman Joe Moakley, John W. McCormack
Institute for Public Affairs (1995), reprinted at Chttp://www.house.gov/moakley/demumass. .
land> (visited Mar. 5, 1999).
206 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
107 See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 63; supra notes 34-81 and accompanying text.
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and politics to white supremacy:2"H Their theory is a stark departure
from what most Americans, of all races, believe:2 •
A. The Liberal Tradition. in America
Unlike the race-crits, the vast majority of Americans have believed,
at least since the eighteenth century, in a broad set of principles that
can be classified, albeit vaguely, as "liberal." 21 " As obvious as these
principles may seem, it is necessary to revisit them briefly, if only to
explain what CRT purports to reject. Liberalism may be defined as be-
lief in government with the consent of the governed; 2 " representative
democracy;212 equality;21 " guaranteed liberties; 211 separated institutions
checking and balancing one another; 21 ' and multiple sovereignties of
federal, state, local and individual authority."' These principles are
embodied in the higher law of constitutions, which are enforced (im-
perfectly) by reasonably independent judges (appointed through po-
litical processes), under a rule of law, 217 which is largely insulated from
partisan politics. 2 ''
2°8 See supra notes 34-81 and accompanying text.
219 See HuNTINGTorr, supra note 2, at. 17-23; re also infra notes 335-40 and accompanying
text.
218 See HARTZ, supra note 2, at 9-10 (stating that AITICriCalls adhere to "liberal Hill");
HUNTINGTON, ROM note 2, at 21-23 (describing majority adherence to liberal political principles
over American history); MYRDAL, SUM note 2, tut 3-9 (describing "American Creed").
211 See generally EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVER-
EIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
212 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (explaining that a "republic" delegates
government to "a small number of citizens elected by the rest" whose "wisdom may best discern
the trite interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations").
2"See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1770) ("We hold these truths to be
self evident, that all men are created equal ....").
214 See U.S. CONST. amends. 1-IX, XIII, XIV, XV.
215 SeeTnt: FEDERALIST No. Si (James Madison) (explaining that Constitution divides powers
of federal government to prevent concentration of powers in one body, thereby protecting
liberty).
2111 See U.S. CONST. amends. 1X-X,
217
 See. Millbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (stating that the "government
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, arid not of men");
Thomas Paine, Common Sense, rriorinted in THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND THE CRISIS 4 1
(Doubleday Dolphin 1960) (177(1) (stating that "in America THE LAW IS KING").
218 See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1944) (staling that "the very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy )- ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT'
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25-26 (Yale 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (discussing advantages of Supreme
Cara't's insulation from politics).
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To subscribe to such principles is not necessarily to practice them.
The man who wrote the Declaration of Independence owned 200
slaves. 219
 He was, like most of us, both principled and inconsistent. 22°
Indeed, liberalism makes bold promises and continually fails to live up
to them.221
 Nor does faith in the liberal tradition mean that Americans
would automatically agree on particular policies if they only were
faithful to their common creed. American politics is united by an
overarching consensus on basic principles, 222 and divided among a
myriad of conflicting interests that make consistent and uniform ad-
herence to common principles unlikely. 22'
Liberal principles are therefore "indeterminate" to the extent that
they are not mechanically determinative of every con troversy. 224 In-
deed, as Samuel Huntington has pointed out, Americans hold poten-
tially conflicting ideals (such as individualism and democracy, liberty
and equality) simultaneously, without trying to resolve the conflicts
between them once and for 1111. 2" Rather, they have set up processes
and institutions to resolve conflicts pragmatically, case-by-case, issue-by-
issue, problem-by-problem . 226
 Liberals, unlike radical legal theorists,
assume that there are no universal solvents, that values are not easily
ranked"' and that reasoning by analogy is usually more helpful (and
more persuasive) than deductions from the abstract theories of phi-
losopher-kings. 228 Liberal politics, like the common-law courts on which
it relies, requires perpetual re-examination of both the major and
219 SeejOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 144 (1997).
•2U See id, at 144-52.
221 See MYRDAL, supra new 2, at 13 ("While the Creed is important and is enacted into law,
it is not lived up to in practice.").
222 See HARTZ, SUPta DO' 2, at 3-32; MYRDAL, SHAM note 2, at 3-9; TOCIQUEVILLE, StiPra now
2, passim.
229 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 5-12 (arguing that America is both united by consensus
of general principles and divided by pluralism).
224 As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases."
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
221 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 16.
226 See id. There is great democratic strength in the liberal system's ability to work conflicts
out pragmatically, without having to reconcile grand philosophical tensions imposed front above.
See HARTz, supra note 2, at 276-77 (noting that American political pragmatism allowed the New
Deal to take place, despite adherence in principle to value of individualism); WOOD, supra note
2, at 7-8 (praising eclecticism of Revolutionary generation's writers, who could blend "classical
antiquity, Christian theology, English empiricism, and European rationalism" without any sense
of incongruity).
227 See HUNTINGTON, StfPia note 2, at 16.
229 Learned Hand once said that he would find it "most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were
in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some
part in the direction of public affairs." Quoted in BICKEL, supra note 218, al 20.
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minor premises of most legal syllogisms. It allows for both continuity
and change, stability and flexibility, tradition and innovation. 52 •
The liberal system's celebrated capacity for social change rests in
the ability of aggrieved citizens to confront power-holders, such as
legislators, judges or voters, with their failures to live up to the promises
of the "American Creed." 23" In doing so, the aggrieved can argue with
sonic force that they are seeking justice, not revolution, when in fact
they may be seeking both."' The Voting Rights Act of 1965, for exam-
ple, was not a radical measure, yet it started a revolution in Southern
politics.232 It purported to secure a right already enshrined in the
Fifteenth Amendment,233 and thus fulfill fundamental notions of equal-
ity that most Americans could not easily deny. 231 The Act would prob-
ably not have passed, however, if it had been presented as a benefit to
one group to the detriment of another in a zero-sum power game.
Second, liberal politics is about morality as well as interests. It is
about holding public officials morally and politically responsible for
meeting unfulfilled promises. 235 By casting victims of discrimination as
legitimate claimants to the promise of equality in the American Creed,
liberal politics gives victims the higher moral ground, without fully
separating them from the people whose oppressive behavior they seek
to change.2"" The Reverend Martin Luther King exemplified this prom-
issory politics best on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963, when
he said:
22• See generally 1_,Evt, supra note 2.
2511 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 3 (describing struggles of 1960s as involving not
"conflicts between partisans of different principles," but "a reaffirmation of traditional American
ideals and values; {the 1960sJ were a time of comparing practice to principle, of reality to ideal,
of behavior to belief").
251 For example, gay rights advocates in the United States are currently arguing that states
should recognize gay couples' right to marry on the ground that restricting marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples is gender-discriminatory. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63-68 (Flaw. 1993). The
argument harks back to funtlantent al notions of equality, but would radically cluntge our concep-
tion of marriage, See id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that racial
classifications embodied in antimiscegenation law violated Equal. Protection Clause).
252 See getter ally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTIE THE IMPACT OF 'run: VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Crofinan eds., 1994).
255 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Slat. 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973 ei seq.) (describing Act as measure "to enforce the fifteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States . ...'').
234 See MYRDAL, supra ante 2, at 8-9.
255 Sanittel Huntington calls this the "ideals versus institutions" gap, which is often responded
to with moralistic calls for Fermin. Sett HuNTitstraont, supra note 2, at 10-12, 64-68.
2511 See HERBERT HAINES, BLACK RADICALS AND THE. CIVIL RIGHTS MAINSTREAM, 1954-1970,
at 43 (1988) (noting that Martin Luther King could credibly cast himself as "conservative militant"
and thereby "talk ... to whites without alienating them").
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In a sense we've come to our nation's capital to cash a check:
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent
words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, they were signing a promissory note to which every
American was to fall heir. This note was the promise that all
men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaran-
teed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.
It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this prom-
issory note. ... America has given Negro people a had check;
a check which has come back marked "insufficient funds." We
refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great
vaults of this nation. And so we have come to cash this check,
a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom,
and the security of justice. 2"7
Through this metaphor, King brilliantly articulated the promises
and realities that animated the civil rights revolution in America. 238
He reminded Americans of their founding principles, assumed the
fundamental equality of the bargainers, and placed the power struc-
ture on the delensive. 239
 King did not paint whites as irredeemably
racist; he simply insisted that they live up to their obligations." )
To Derrick Bell, in contrast, the coffers of justice in America have
always been empty. To him, the promises of liberalism are just "bogus
freedom checks" which "the Man" will never honor. 24 ' Bell, like other
race-crits, attacks American liberalism from a European political ori-
entation, which conceives of politics as a zero-sum struggle between
entrenched classes or groups. 242 In this view, all politics is power poli-
tics, and law serves merely as an instrument or oppression by the group
'2"See Martin Luther King, Jr„ I Have a Dream, reprinted in 21 NEGRO HISTORY BULLETIN
16-17 (1968) (hereinafter King, I Have a Dream).
238
 See id.
2399
	 id.
24° See id.
241 See FACES, supra note 73, at 18.
212 Compare MARX & ENGELS, supra note 44, at 79-94 (describing all history as struggle
between two classes—hotugeoisie and proletariat) with Matsuda, supra note 9, at 70 (separating
society into "victims" of diScrimination and "perpetrators" of it). The best-known American
counterpart of this class-based tradition is Charles Beard. See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Free Press 1986)
(1913) (arguing that Framers' own property interests were primary motivation for creation of
Constitution). As Louis Hartz explains, this species of political thought has never found American
soil very fertile because Americans never had a feudal past. See HARTZ, supra note 2, at 9. Licking
feudalism, Hartz posits, America lacks the class orientation necessary for socialism. See id.
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that happens to be in power. 2' 3 No common principles exist which
might persuade whites to he more inclusive. 241
The race-crits, like other class theorists, do not attempt to prove
that African Americans are permanently disadvantaged; they simply
assert it Nor do they acknowledge that black Americans have made
considerable (although Far from satisfitctory) progress since de jure
segregation was ended."' Critical race theory, like Marxism before it,
1.1 :I.See Bell, Realism, .supra note 4, at 369 (arguing that "the rule of law," despite its formal
commitment to racial equality, merely provides cover for racist choices by judges).
249 cf. Bell, Interest-Convergence, supra note 33, at 22-23 (arguing that whites do not support
civil rights from principle, but only to serve their own "interests"),
245 See Rookie:0 CI IRONICL1S, salmi note (3, at 144 (arguing that liberal democracy is "as rigid
a system as the Middle Ages" in keeping minorities down, but offering no evidence to support
that assertion).
"'Although still disadvantaged and discriminated against, African Americans have made
substantial progress over the last Forty years. Most strikingly, a black middle class has emerged
that, as a group, now outnumbers the black poor. SrePATrEksoN, supra note 23, at 22, 30. As of
1995, accordinig to sociologist Orlando Patterson, 36% of black ['nullities were in the middle class,
compared to 26.4% that were pour. See id. The trend 11115 continued since Patterson's book:
between 1990 and 1997, the poverty rate for African-American families decliued from 26.1% to
23,6%. See Bureau of the Census Public Information Office, Number of African Americans in
Poverty Declines While Income Rises, Census Bureau Reports, Press Release, Sept. 24', 19t18
<http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/c1)98-176.1itml > (visited Feb. 19, 1999). The median
income of black families lose 5.4% during the satire period. See Bureau of the Census, Along
Income in the United States: 1997, at 15. And, for the rum time in American history, a significant
category of black Americans now care Ma re than their white counterparts: as of March 1993,
black women with bachelors' degrees earned a median income of $27.745, continared with
earnings of $26,356 by Wi411 shnilar educational attainment. See PATTERsoN, supra
note 29, at 27.
The growth of the black iniddle class has been fueled in large part by rising educational
attainment. In 1940, the percentage of black Americans ages 25 to 29 who had completed four
years of high school was 12.3%, compared nn 41.2% of while youths. See id. at 20. By 1995, that
gap had all but been eliminated: the black graduation mte had risen to 865%, w h ile that of
whites rose to 87.4%. See id. College completion lines are less encouraging. Although black
graduation rates have increased tenfold, front 1.5% in 1940 to 13% in 1995, this is still barely
half the 24% college completion nue of whites. See id. at 21.
The economic record remains mixed. On the positive side, the per capita income of African
Americans nearly doubled between 1967 and 1997, from $6,190 to $12,351, measured in 1997
dollars. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Income Tables—People <Intlp://www,ceusus.gov/
Ithesiincome/histincipolb.html> (visited Feb. 19, 1090). The poverty rate fine blacks, however,
has been slow to decline—between 1975 and 1993 ii stagnated at about 50%. See Bureau of the
Census, Measuring 50 Years of Economic Change Using the March Current Population Survey', Sept.,
1998, at 45. Most tragically of ail, the brunt of African-American poverty is borne by children-
41.5% of black children under the age of 18 living in families were poor ill 1995. See PATTERSON,
supra note 23, at 29.
The progress of black Americans is also mixed when incomes arc compared, In 1967, the
per capita income of black Americans was about 54% that of whites. See U.S. Census Alltrat
Historical Income Tables—People < http:/Aw.cennsus.gov/11
 hes/in come/In istinc/p0 11).111ml>
(visited Feb. 19, 1999). lu 1997, blacks as It group canned only 60% of what whites did. See id.
There is also ;I striking gap, however, between black men and black women: the median income
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clings to group "domination" as the single cause of disadvantage.2' 7 It
takes one unifying idea—racial domination—and tries to fit all facts
and law into it. 248
Liberalism, on the other hand, distrusts grand unifying theories,
preferring to emphasize process over ends. 24' As a result, liberalism
frustrates anyone, Left or Right, who would have governments embrace
their ideologies. 25° Because of the value liberals place on liberty, they
tend to he wary of the sort of power concentrations that could mandate
changes quickly."' They prefer a more incremental approach to politi-
cal change that depends on the consent of the governed, even when
the governed are often ignorant, misguided and even bigoted. 252
 Lib-
eralism is never utopian, by anyone's definition, but always procedural,
because it presupposes a society of people who profoundly disagree
with each other and whose interests, goals, stakes and stands, cannot
easily, if ever, be fully reconciled.'" Because of these differences, liber-
als know there is no such thing as a "benevolent despot," and that
utopias almost invariably turn out to be dystopias. 254
of black men in 1997 was 69.3% that of white men, up from 57.2 in 1967. See Bureau of the
Census, Measuring 50 Yeats of Economic Change Using the Mardi Current Population Survey, Sept.
1998, at G7. Black women of all education levels now make 94.6% of what white women do, up
from 78.7% in 1967. See id.
247 Compare MARX & ENGELS, supra note 44, at 79-94 (describing all history as struggle
between two classes—bourgeoisie and proletariat) with Matsuda, supra note 9, at 70 (separating
society into "victims" of discrimination and "perpetrators" of it).
248 See generally KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9.
245 S„, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 163-75 (1989) (rejecting Familiar
contrast between "substance" and "process" in politics, arguing instead that democratic process
is a "rich bundle of substantive goods"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 10I (1980)
("What has distinguished [the American Constitution], and indeed the United States itself, has
been a process of government, not a governing ideology.").
254)
 C'f. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (stating that Constitution is intended to
control effects of "faction," the natural human tendency to separate into groups that could harm
interests or rights of others).
251 cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 Uames Madison) (explaining that Constitution divides powers
of federal government to prevent concentration of powers in one body, thereby protecting
liberty).
252 As Winston .
 Church ill noted, "Democracy is the worst form of government except all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time." See Winston Churchill, Address at the House
of Commons (Nov. 1947), in INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 231 (1970).
255
 SeeELY , supra note '249, at 88-101 (noting that main purpose of Constitution is to set up
decisionmaking processes that embody popular sovereignty yet protect minorities in pluralistic
democracy); George Kate!), Remarks on the Procedures of Constitutional Democracy, in CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: Mims XX 215, 217 O. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) (stating
that It:Jet -tan' procedures are the soul of constitutional democracy, precisely because of their
intrinsic value" in thwarting oppression).
2" See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Perennial Classics 1998) (1932); GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 1989) (1949).
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Race-crits, on the other hand, are profoundly utopian and some-
times totalitarian. 25' In their view, the law should ferret out and elimi-
nate white racism at any costa''' Richard Delgado, for example, com-
plains that "[n]othing in the law requires any [white] to lend a helping
hand, to try to help blacks find jobs, befriend them, speak to them,
make eye contact with them, help them fix a flat when they arc
stranded on the highway, help them feel like 11111 persons. ... How can
a system like that change anything?" 257
The race-crits, in their preoccupation with power, forget that the
power to persuade remains the principal way of achieving lasting
change in a democratic political culture.258 A beneficial but controver-
sial measure is much more likely to survive changes of the party in
power if it can be said to carry out the will of "the people," from whom
all power in the United States is said to derive. 25" For example, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, controversial as it was,'" has remained a bulwark
of civil rights protection for thirty-six years because of its democratic
and constitutional legitimacy. 2" 1 On the other hand, if Malcolm X or
the Black Panthers had attempted to set up a separate black state on
American soil in the tradition of John Brown, their efforts would have
been crushed immediately.
B. Are Race- Cuts Legal Theorists?
At bottom, CRT fails because of its single-mindedly "critical" char-
acter. Race-crits bewail minority disadvantage, blame liberal values for
"constructing" this disadvantage and dismiss any defense of them as a
2r' 5 Sre RODRIGO CIIRONIGLES, 511Pra liolt! 6, at 141, 144 (insisting that Eldighteninent democ-
racy is "source of black people's subordination").
25 '3 See id, at 78-79.
2" M. at 78.
2" ScrITocqurytt.t.ii, supra note 2, at 107 (stating that people who wish to attack democrati-
cally-enacted laws must "either change the opinion of the nation, or trample upon its decision").
255 See U.S. CoNsT. preamble ("We the People . do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America."); TuCQUEVILLE, Supra note 2, al 106, (staling that "there is an
amazing sti -eligth in the expression of the will of a whole people; and when it declares itself, even
the imagination of those who would wish to contest it is overawecl").
"See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF— (HE 1964 CIVIL. RIGHTS ACT (1085).
2111 The Act was passed by an overwhelming vole in Congress, see id. at.2 15, 221't, and upheld
repeatedly by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Kaltenbach V. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 370 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding public accommodations
provision of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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legitimation of white supremacy. 262 But here endeth their analysis. As
CLS scholar Mark Tushnet admitted: "Critique is all there is." 263
"Critique," however, never built anything, and liberalism, for all
its shortcomings, is at least constructive. It provides broadly-accepted,
reasonably well-defined principles to which political advocates may
appeal in ways that transcend sheer power, with at least some hope of
incremental success:26' Critical race theory would "deconstruct" this
imperfect tradition, but offers nothing in its place.
An apt example of how unconstructive CRT is can be found in its
approach to equality. To the extent that race-crits discuss "equality" at
all, they do so less to advance tangible goals than to disparage liberal-
ism's different approaches, including the ultimate goal of a society
where race does not matter. 265 The race-crits are particularly hostile to
the liberal ideal of "color blindness," expressed most eloquently by
Martin Luther King's dream that his children "will one day live in a
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by
the content of their character."266 To the race-crits, this integrationist
goal of color-blind constitutionalism is not just naive or preinature. 2"7
In Neil Gotanda's words, it "supports the supremacy of white interests
and must therefore be regarded as racist." ! 08 Unlike King, who saw
affirmative action as a color-conscious means to a more inclusive,
integrated nation , "9 race-crits consider affirmative action an end in
itself, more akin to an award of permanent damages than transitional
assistance:270 To the race-crits, any doctrine that gets in the way of that
end, including egalitarian colorblindness, is ipso facto "racist." 271
262 See WORDS THAT WOUND, swim note 7, at G.
263 MARK TUSHNET, RED, Wu rrE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW
318 (1988).
2th See supra notes 210-40 and accompanying text.
265 See, e.g., KEY WRITINGS, SUMO note 9, xiii—xxxii (disparaging liberal equality theories, but
offering no replacements). •
266 King, I Have a Dream, supra note 237, at 16-17; see also KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at
xv (criticizing liberal adherence to King's dream).
267 See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 0, at xv, xxix (parodying liberalism's adherence to "color-
blindness" as naive belief that "if we could just agree to abandon race-consciousness, racism and
racial power would somehow recede from the American political imagination").
2118 Neil Gotada, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, "irt KEY WRITINGS, supra note
9, at 257,272.
269 King argued, "How then can he [the Negro] be absorbed into the mainstream of Ameri-
can life if we do not do something special fm• him now, in order to balance the equation and
equip him to compete on a just and equal basis?" MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T
WAIT 134 (1964). King's goal was integration, not "atonement for atonement's sake." Id. at 135.
270 See Delgado, Imperial Scholar; supra note 126, at 50 (advocating reparations theory of
affirmative action over social utility theory because former recognizes "the obligation of the
majority to render [minority communities] whole").
271 See Gotanda, supra note 268, at 272.
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Race-crits also reject the liberal idea of equality as "belonging" that
inspired much of the civil rights movement:27' Under this view, so
eloquently advanced by Kenneth Karst, equality occurs when all people
"belong" to America, that is, when they gain equal citizenship and
equal justice under the Constitution, despite their pluralistic differ-
ences.'" The race-crits, however, usually reject inclusion. They prefer
the separatist and unattainable goal of black nationalisni. 274 Richard
Delgado, for example, believes that whites are so different from mi-
norities that the groups should have as little to do with each other as
possible.275
Finally, the race-crits ridicule the idea of "equal opportunity" that
inspires much of liberal political and economic thought, 27C In a perva-
sively racist society, they say, there is no such thing as equality of
opportunity for minorities because the system and its operators will
always favor members of the majority.'" "Merit," to the race-crits, is a
racist construct calculated to keep whites in charge, and therefore a
merit-based equality of opportunity amounts only to "affirmative action
Ibr whites."27"A better endeavor, they argue, would engage in "a broad-
272 See, e.g., Sterling A. Brown, Count Us In, in WHAT THE NEGRo WANTS 308, 331 (Rayford
W. Logan ed., 1009) (1944) ("Negroes want to be counted in. They want to belong. They want
what other men have wanted deeply enough to fight and suffer for it, They want democracy.").
2" See generally KENNETH KARST, BELONGING '1'0 AMERICA: Num. CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989).
274 An entire chapter of Delgado's compilation of critical race theory is dedicated to themes
of racial separatism. See CM-TING EDGE, supra note 27, at 345-87; see also WORDS THAT WOUND,
supra note 7, at 6 (stating that CRT borrows from "nationalism"),
275 See RACE. WAR, supra note 9, at 31 (arguing that whites should not attempt to help
minorities, but should stick to themselves instead); Delgado, Imperial Scholar; supra note 120, at
48-49 (stating that whites cannot faithfully represent interests of minorities).
2741 See, e.g., RoN Au) DWORKIN, TAKING Rico ITS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (speaking of "the right,
not to receive the same distribution of some burden or benefit, bu t to he treated with the same
respect and concern as anyone else"); JOHN RANI s, A •HEORY OF _JUSTICE 92-93 (1971) ("[Al
person's good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of life given
reasonably favorable circumstances,"); MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE;
A PHILOSOPHICAL. AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 22 (1991) (defining equality of opportunity' as
idea that "individuals are entitled to equal autonomy and equal respect as subjects of moral choice
capable of devising and pursuing their own respective life plains").
277 See Romuco CluzoNicus, supra note 0, at 72 (concluding that whites invariably come
out ahead in system of equality of opportunity); Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race
Problem, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1398 (1991) (stating that "Law's preference for protecting only
equality of opportunity is ... a veiled way of assuring that those who benefit from the current
rules of the game continue winning").
278 See RODRIGO CHRONICLES, SI/p117 note 0, at 72; see also KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, al xv
(scoring liberals for "constructing 'discrimination' as a deviation from otherwise legitimate
selection processes" and thereby endorsing the possibility of objective, neutral academic selection
standards),
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scale inquiry into why jobs, wealth, education, and power are distrib-
uted as they are."279
So what conception of "equality" would the race-crits impose in
place orliberal egalitarianism? They never say, but they come closest
with their occasional calls for "equality of results" through reparations-
based affirmative action .28° For example, Cheryl Harris proposes that
affirmative action should "equaliz[e] treatment by redistributing power
and resources in order to rectify inequities and to achieve real equal-
ity."28 ' Similarly, Mari Matsuda argues for racial reparations in part
because they would alleviate "the destabilizing inequities in wealth
distribution,"282 while Richard Delgado advocates "equality of result" as
a more simple, direct and effective goal than the complicated, value-
laden "equality of opportuni Ly. "283
No race-crit, however, has explained what "equality of results"
means. The term seems to suggest equality of resources for all citizens,
but race-crits do not explicitly advocate either communism or social-
ism. More likely, they would prefer a rough distribution of resources
between "racial" groups—e.g., a reparations tax system that would
grant each ethnic group money and power commensurate with its
percentage of the population. 281
 Yet the race-crits do not say who
should pay and who should benefit from such a system. 285
 Should the
"one drop of blood" method of racial classification apply, 286 or should
a person have to be primarily of minority stock to receive reparations?
To the race-crits, all black Americans are clearly victims of slavery and
racism,287
 but should recent immigrants from Haiti, Africa or Europe
receive the same benefits as descendants of American slaves? Are all
black descendants of American slaves entitled to payments, or do
blacks with slave-owning ancestors fit into Mari Matsuda's class of
278 KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at xv.
288 See, e.g., RODRIGO CHRONICLES, 3Itpal note 6, at 70. This focus on "equality of result- is
also consistent with their criticism of the had motive requirement articttlated in Davis. See supra
notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
ter Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in KEY WRITINGS, Minn note 9, at 276,289.
282 Mari Matstula, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 323,391 (1987).
2" RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 6, at 71.
284 Palll Butler endorses this percentage approach as a way to change the racial makeup of
prison populations. See Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 54, at 886-87.
285 They also fail to say which governmental institution would order such a redistribution.
286 Under the "one-drop of blood" rule, which has its origins in the racist fear of miscegena-
tion, anyone with "one drop" of African ancestry is classified as "black." For a good discussion
on the sinister implications of the "one drop" rule, see PArIERSON, supra note 23, at 68-72.
297 See, e.g., Butler, Affirmative Action, supra note 54, at 861-62.
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"perpetrator descendants" who must pay?288 Would Asians be classified
as an oppressed minority, or would they be forced to give up their
disproportionate share of wealth?2" If all Asians are "victims," as Mat-
suda has suggested, 29° must a third-generation Japanese American he
aided equally to a recently-arrived Vietnamese or Laotian immigrant?
Should all Native American tribes receive payments, or only those
without successful casinos? Suppose, after the initial payment, one
ethnic group's average wealth fell behind that of another. Should the
allocations be reshuffled• annually to achieve "equality of result?"29 '
And how much of a redistribution of "power" is necessary to
achieve "equality of result?" 292 Should official positions be rotated
among representatives of various ethnic groups, or is it enough to
gerrymander voting districts to assure the election of minoritics? 2 •I's
Perhaps political appointments, (especially those of judges) , 2" should
be distributed among race-group caucuses in proportion to the per-
centage of ethnic groups in the population. And perhaps corporations
should be required to elect CEOs from among different ethnic groups
every few years.
Critical race theory's failure to address the difficulties of adminis-
tering a reparations-based, "equality of result!' system leaves one with
the impression that either they really are not. serious, or their invoca-
tion of "equality" is little more than an assertion of group interests.
Indeed, the more pessimistic race-crits, like Derrick Bell, would be
happiest if social reformers jettisoned the goal of "equality" altogether,
because that goal "merely perpetuates our disempowerment."291 Illegal
doctrine is to be judged solely by how it advances the interest of racial
minorities, the race-crits implicitly dismiss any vision of equality that
could aid other disadvantaged groups, or that could treat disadvan-
taged members of the racial majority with equal concern and respect. 29'
2" See Matsuda, supra note 9, at 70.
289 See Bureau or the Census, Public information °Bice, Asians and Pacific Islanders. Have
Nation's Highest Median Household Income in 1997, Census Bureau Reports, Press Release, Sein.
24,1998.
290 See Matsuda, sutra note 9, at 70-71.
291 See Harris, supra note '281, at 289.
292 See id.
295 See generally Lani Gunner, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Emperor's Clothes, in KEY WRITINGS, supra note 9, at 205.
294 See generally Sherrilyn A. Bill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Repre-
sentation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause should be read to require appointment of more minority judges).
21* Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 377.
296 Compare infra note 297 with DWORKIN, supra 1101C 27(1, at 227 (defining equality as
right ... to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else").
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To the race-crits, the proper inquiry is not how the law lives up to
aspirations or principles, but how it serves the interests of a constitu-
en cy. 297
In this respect, the race-crits are more political advocates than
legal scholars. 2"8 There is, of course, nothing wrong with being an
advocate, and disadvantaged people certainly need advocates. But legal
theories—the principles and ideas that guide the determination of
legal outcomes—must transcend mere factional interests if they are to
aid minorities. They must win the majority's acquiescence, if not its
active support. So far, race-crits have not provided such a theory. CRT
is only "scholarly resistance" that lives within, and indeed depends
upon, the liberal legal order. 2"" Without liberalism to "critique," critical
race theory would have little meaning. In the end, critical race theory
could no more supplant liberalism than the mission statement of a
political action committee could replace the Constitution.
C. Critical Race Theory as Advocacy
How effective, then, is CRT as advocacy for racial minorities within
the liberal system? The answer depends, of course, on one's criteria.
As a therapeutic screed against the frustrations of incremental liberal-
ism, critical race theory probably "works" well." It may also push
liberals into constructive action, much as black radicals pushed whites
into the arms of Martin Luther King, jr.""' If advocacy is judged by its
ability to persuade others, however, CRT must be judged a failure.
297 Consider, for example, the following monologue by Delgado's character Rodrigo:
The law-lover will subscribe to the mythic, heroic views about the rule of law and
insist that everything else be addressed within that framework. We, by contrast, will
take a more utilitarian view of law, as the Panthers did. We'll ask "What can law do
for us at this time and place?"
RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 47.
-)8 See Abernathy, supra note 47, at 378 (arguing that Charles Lawrence and Mari Matsuda's
recent book defending affirmative action amounts to "advocacy scholarship" which "overstates
the case, dehumanizes the opposition, and turns off as many readers as it may convert").
299 See Bell, Who's Afraid?, supra note 50, at 900.
"'Derrick Bell considers the therapeutic effect of railing against white racism to be an
important part of CRT. See id. at 910 (suggesting that CRT need not be justified by what it
accomplishes, but rather serves as Its own legitimation. . . . There is sufficient satisfaction for
those who write in the myriad methods of critical race theory that comes from the work itself");
Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 364, 377 (arguing that blacks should abandon goal of equality and
instead seek to "make their voice and outrage heard" through adoption of "racial realism," a
mindset that accepts the permanence of subordination, thereby making life bearable in a society
where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class").
" See FiA INES, supra note 236, at 75-76.
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Despite its ten years as a "movement," 12 its voluminous publications
and ubiquitous presence in law schools,"" critical race theory has had
almost no influence outside the walls of academia?'rThis poor showing
can be attributed to the inherent inadequacies of the theory.
First, the race-crits' critique of liberalism is historically and ana-
lytically at odds with the common law system of reasoning by analogy
and ensuring equality by following precedent. To theni, the unifying
explanation of American history is racial doinination, so any seeming
departure from that ideology must be either a fleeting aberration or a
ruse to protect white supremacy."'" For example, Derrick Bell believes
that because the federal Constitution accommodated slavery, no mean-
ingful theory of racial equality can possibly be deduced from 4. 3" He
holds to this absolute position despite decades of opinions and laws
that have subjected racial classifications to a degree of scrutiny so strict
in theory that it is fatal in fact."' Indeed, Bell's ! ►ells on the intentions
of the Framers rather than their larger purposes is as unhelpful in its
own way as Raoul Berger's slavish historicism.'ll
By contrast, liberal jurisprudence allows legal advocates to ignore
the specific intentions of ignoble framers in order to give nobility to
their grand promises.'" Thus, Sir Edward Coke was not bothered by
the fact that the Magna Carta was obtained by extortion and meant to
802 See KEY WRITINGS, sufira note 9, at xiii (describing CRT as "MOVC111C111 of left scholars").
"See Lewis, supra note I (stating is critical race theorists "are on the fitculty at almost
every major law school"). •
" } In a recent Westlaw search, the author found no reference in any U.S. court opinion to
"critical race theory." The most prominent CRT luminaries, Derrick Bell, Mari Matsuda and
Richard Delgado, are rarely cited—when they are, it is tonally in support of the untemarkable
claim that racial insults can amorist to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See,
'Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 695 (N.J. 1908) (citing Delgado, Tort Action, supra note
136). Mari Matsuda tras also cited by the Minnesota Supreme Conit in its 1991 ruling, later
reversed, in In re Welfare of R.A.V., which upheld a municipal hate-speech code. See 464 N.Vir.2d
507, 508 (Minn. 1991) (citing Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 157), rev'd, R.A.Y. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). None of CRT's more radical assertions have made it into U.S. case
law—a rather poor showing for what Come! West has called "the most exciting development in
contemporary legal studies." KEN' WRITINGS, supra note 9, at xi,
" 5 See Bell, Interest-Contingence, supra note 33, at '22.
500 See Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 376.
9417 See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 2 (holding that racial classifications embodied in antimis-
cegenation law violated Equal Protection Clause); Brown v, Board of Educ., 317 U.S. 183 (1954)
(holding that state-sanctioned racial segregation of public schools violates Equal Protection
Clause).
104 See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION O1 THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) (signing that Fourteenth Amendment must he construed
precisely within limits of its flamers' intent, which allegedly excluded SUbSlantive due process
analysis),
H"See infra notes 310-15 and accompanying text,
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benefit the nobility.3 1 ° By creative interpretation, he transformed that
crabbed feudal contract into a mythic charter of liberty. 3 " Abraham
Lincoln knew that the most inspiring words of the Declaration of
Independence were not meant to end slavery, but he realized their
potential.312 Congresswoman Katherine St. George understood that
equality for the sexes was added to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by racist,
sexist men in a cynical effort to defeat the She just smiled,
knowing that great legal principles have a way of transcending their
origins.3" In short, American liberals have not allowed their jurispru-
dence to become frozen by an excess of historicism. In jurisprudence,
as in nearly everything else, they have been cheerfully eclectic, prag-
matic and undogmatic. 315
The second reason the race-crits fail as legal advocates is that their
"deconstruction" of neutral principles and the rule of law leave them
unpersuasive to judges who have pledged to uphold both. No judge
could possibly trust a piece of scholarship to reflect law or facts accu-
rately if the scholar who wrote it had previously declared that law is.
merely politics and that political ends are all that count in legal advo-
cacy:41 ' For example, Kimberle Crenshaw has described the civil rights
litigation of the 1950s and 1960s not as an effort to redeem principles,
but as a cynical "manipulation of legal rhetoric" and use of "appropri-
ate rhetorical and legal incantations" to dupe the state into achieving
the desired political outcome: dismantling white supremacy. 317 Given
judges' institutional commitment to legal principles (not to mention
their distaste for being overturned on appeal), it is unlikely that even
liberal judges would give further "incantations" from Crenshaw much
weight.
In debunking the rule of law, the race-crits think of themselves as
more "realistic" than liberals who believe (or hope) that the law can
31° See A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEADE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM IN AMERICA 6-8 (1968); ANNE PALLISTER, MAGNA CARTA: THE HERITAGE OP LIBERTY
34, 78 (1971).
311 See HOWARD, supra note 310, of 118-22. Herbert Wechlser once celebrated the creative
interpretation of Magna Carla: "I cannot find it in my heart to regret that interpretation [of
Magna Carta] did not ground itself in ancient history but rather has perceived ... a compendious
affirmation of die basic values of a free society . ." Wechsler, supra note 85, at 19.
312 See CARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 99-103
(1992).
313 See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 260, at I 15-18.
314 See id. at 117.
515 See HUNTINGToN, supra note 2, at 15-16; Wool>, supra note 2, at 7.
316 See Lawrence, Word & Ritter, supra note It), at MO.
317 See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, supra note 33, at 117.
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be impartial.' In truth, they are less so. Instances in which judges
ignore precedent. to achieve some blatantly partisan end are not un-
known, but they are rare. More often, judges swallow their political
misgivings about laws and apply them. This was certainly true of the
nineteenth-century judges who opposed slavery yet enforced the
five slave laws,''•' as it is of present-day judges who oppose mandatory
sentences, but impose them." 2" It is as true of the judges who ruled in
favor of the Amistad captives'2 ' as it is of the president who sent troops
to Little Rock to enforce a judicial order to desegregate the schools." 22
Such officials may be political apparatchiks, but that is different from
their being purely partisan.
Third, race-crits are politically ineffective because they deliber-
ately choose racialist rhetoric that alienates whites."'" Unlike Dr. King,
who extended his hand to whites and expressed his faith that they
could redeem the promises of their ancestors," 21 race-crits give up on
whites as slaves to bigotry. 325 Consider Bell's "Space Traders" story: in
the year 2000, Bell posits, seventy percent of Americans would vote to
send blacks away in spaceships if presented with the right benelit."2'
Jewish Americans would oppose the trade, he says, but not from prin-
ciple."27 They would fear that "in the absence of blacks, Jews could
become the scapegoats." 1 t28 Sonie rich whites would protest the deal,'
but only because they know that blacks deflect potential class-based
318 See Bell, Realism, supra note 4, at 365-67.
519 See, e.g., ELt JAH Anww, Tilt: GENIUS OF LEMUEL SHAW: EXPOUNDER OF THE COMMON LAW
93-94 (1062) (explaining that Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw upheld federal Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, despite his personal loathing of slavery, in order to protect integrity of Constitution and of
Union).
520 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, A Great Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, at A15 (telling story ()I'
Angela Thompson, a seventeen-year-ol(I girl with no prior criminal recool, who was setnenceil
under New York's tough anti-drug laws to eight years to life by Justice Juanita Bing Newton. The
judge admitted that having to impose the sentence brought her "to tears, literally").
421 See llowarto JONES, MUTINY ON THE Asus'rAv: THE SAGA OF A SLAVE REVOLT AND ITS
IMPACT ON AMERICAN ABOLITION, Law, AND DIPLOMACY 170-94 (1987) (noting that several
Southerners (including Chief .Instice Taney, who would later write the Died Scott decision, see
Dred Scott v. Sandford, GO U.S. 393 (1856)), voted to free the illegally-held slaves at issue in the
Amistad case).
522 See ROBERT F. BURK, Tip: EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL. RIGHTS 102
(1981).
"I See, e.g., Butter, Affirmative Action, supra note 54, at 814 ("It is important for the law to
recognize tltat there are so many African Americans in prison because white people have driven
them there.").
524 See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
325 See RACE WAR, supra note 9, at 31: Bell, supra note 74 and accompanying text.
4!6 See Bell, Space Traders, supra note 74, at 192.
"7 See id. at 186.
428 Id.
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unrest by poor whites, who are pacified in the knowledge that they "at
least, remained ahead of blacks." 329 In sum, Bell clearly implies, all
whites are racist—those who appear to stand up for minorities are only
looking out for number one.'" It is hard to imagine how this story
could inspire anything but frustration, dismay and resentment among
white readers.
There is much to be done on behalf of minorities—the criminal
justice system, for example, screams for reform."' But like it or not,
nothing can he accomplished in this country without widespread sup-
port from white Americans. Name-calling and blame games like those
of the race-crits can only make reforms less likely to occur.
Finally, even if the race-crits were to stop demonizing whites, they
would still he doomed to political irrelevancy because their Marxian,
group-based theories have little resonance in a nation which, since its
founding, has rejected the idea of hereditary entitlements.'" Slavery
and racial discrimination are exceptions to thiS tradition—huge, hor-
rific exceptions, but exceptions nonetheless. For all the hypocrisies and
bigotries of its citizens and leaders, the United States does promise
liberty, equality and justice. The gap between these promises and
realities often yaws wide, but the promises abide. They are part of the
"American Dream," the "American Creed"s ` 1 and the American "civil
religion"334
 which no amount of "realism" or cynicism seems able to
smother.
No group in American history has had more reason to disbelieve
America's promises than African Americans. No group should he more
amenable to the cynical separatism of the academic race-crits. And yet,
race-crits are largely marginal among African Americans. Imbued with
Christianity and the American Creed,'" most black Americans rejected
329
 Id, at 181.
330 See id. at 158-94.
331 See generally THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 24, at 195-219 (suggesting reforms to
stem ever-growing prison population).
"'See HAirrz, supra note 2, at 5-6 (arguing that American history lacks feudalism and
therefore lacks hereditary, class-based orientation necessary for socialism).
333 See supra notes 2,210-54 and accompanying text.
334 See generally ROKERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICA'S CIVIL RELIGION IN
TIME OF TRIAL (1975) (examining Americans' quasi-religious adherence to nation's founding
principles).
335 Black Americans have historically believed strongly in the American creed. In 1903, W.E.B.
Du Bois wrote that "there are to-day no truer exponents of the pure human spirit of the
Declaration of Independence than the American Negroes ...." W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK 8 (Bantam Classic 1989) (1903). In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal observed that despite their
full knowledge of their subordinate. status, the "[American Negroes. ] faith in the Creed is not
simply a means of pleading their unfulfilled rights. They, like the whites, are under the spell of
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the appeals of socialists in the late nineteenth century,'”"' Communists
in the 1930s" 7 and neo-Marxist "liberationists" in the 1(,-)60s.'"8 Rather,
when America's unpaid "promissory note" came due in the 1950s and
1960s, they marched forth from Christian churches to demand fulfill-
ment of the very American promise that "all men arc created equal.'"
And faith in the redeemability of America's promises remains in the
African-American community today, sustaining efforts to overcome
continued segregation, unjust incarceration and enduring economic
inequality. 3`1n Thus, the more the race-crits rail against the principles of
liberal democracy,34 t the further they separate themselves from the very
people for whom they claim to speak.
the great national suggestion." MYRDAL, supra note 2, al 4. According to Myrdal, black Americans
had faith, even in the face of seemingly impossible odds, "that ultimately the American Creed
will come out on top." Id. at 799. In 1963, Martin Luther King eloquently expressed that faith
Irani a jail cell; "We will reach the goal of freedom in Birmingham and all over the nation, because
the goal of America is heedom. Abused and scorned though we may be, our destiny is tied tip
with America's destiny." Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham fail, in MARTIN IER
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 92-93 (1964). Later that year', he spoke for a generation of black
Americans when he said that he had "a dream." "It is a dream deeply rooted in the American
dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the trite meaning of its creed—we hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." King, I Have a Dream, supra note
237, at 17. Indeed, even the Black Panthers, oppOsed as they were to integration, could not resist.
quoting as part of their platform the lbst two paragraph is of the ultimate creedal document, the
Declaration of Independence. See THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK 4 (Philip S. Ironer ed., 1970).
Black Americans' adherence to the American creed continues today: black sociologist Orlando
Patterson states that "[African AmericanS) share the same dreams as their fellow citizens, love
and cherish the land of their birth with equal fervor ... and, to every dispassionate observer,
are, in their values, habits, ideals, and ways of living, among the most 'American' of Americans."
PATTERSON, supra note 23, at 171.
"'See generally AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT' IN AMERICA, 1880-1915 (1963) (finding
little interest in socialism among black Americans in late-19th century); SALLY MILLER, RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND GENDER IN EARLY 20TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOCIALISM 42 (1996) (In the first
decades of this century, the Negro demonstrated very little interest in the abolition of  capital-
istrI.. .. As much as other more liwored Americans, he was taught the American mystique of
individual initiative.").
'7 See IRVING HOWE & LEWIS COSER, "EHE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY: A CRITICAL
Tom' 207 (2d. prtg. 1962) (1957) (describing irrelevance of Communist party to black Americans
in 1930s).
"8 See llsarms, supra note 236, at 67-70 (describing left-leaning black "liberationist" groups
of late 1960s as being "quite small in size and limited in impact"),
3" See King, I Have a Dream, supra note 237.
340 See The Rainbow/PUSH Coalition <http://www.rainbowptish.org/aboutrpc/index.fitml >
(visited Man 5, 1999) (quoting Reverend Jesse L. Jackson as stating, 'The American Dream is one
big tent of many culottes, races and religions, Under that tent everybody is assured equal
protection under the law, equal opportunity, equal access and a fair share. Our struggle deruan di
that we open closed doors, extend the tent and even the playing field.").
41 See, e.g., RODRIGO CHRONICLES, supra note 6, at 141, 144 (insisting that DI lighteliment
democracy is "source of black people's subordination").
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CONCLUSION
Despite CRT's more radical rhetoric, some race-crits have recog-
nized the power of the liberal tradition all along, suggesting that many
of them may not he so revolutionary after al1. 342 Angela Harris once
noted that race-crits,: in their non-deconstructive moments, seek "not
to abandon the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and liberal democ-
racy, but to make good on their promises." "3 Similarly, Patricia Wil-
liams has conceded:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it
is also true that blacks believed in them so much and so hard
that we gave them life where there was none before. We held
onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs, mothered
them—not just the notion of them. We nurtured rights and
gave rights life."'
Giving rights life, of course, is what liberalism is all about.
As a movement; critical race theory will eventually dissipate into
the ether from which it came. It has always been irrelevant outside of
academia"' and is now feeling the stress of factionalism within its
ranks. 34t' Hopefully, race-crits will return to the liberal fold sooner
142 See Harris, supra note 11, at 760; Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Resconstructing: Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430 (1987).
143 See Harris, supra note 11, at 760.
344 See Williams, supra note 342, at 430. In reviewing the Critical Legal Studies movement,
Sanford Levinson noted that despite their intentions to produce a radical new concept of the
law, CLS writers exhibited the same inability to truly transcend liberalism's tradition of rights. See
generally Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466
(1983) (book review).
34 ' See supra note 304.
"'There may be "something it) the water" of group-based scholarly movements that causes
them to split into smaller and smaller groups, thus weakening their influence. The Critical Legal
Studies movement was founded to destroy "hierarchy," discrimination and oppression orall kinds,
see Delgado, Ethereal Scholar, supra note 110, at 313, but minority scholars split off to form critical
race theory. The CLS movement then began to fade. See generally Owen Piss, What Is Feminism?,
26 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 413, 424 (1994) (stating that "Critical legal studies is dead"); Minority Critiques,
supra note 109, at 297-447. In recent years, CRT has itself split into two "offshoots": "critical race
feminism" and "LatCrit theory." See jean Stefancic, Latino and Latina Critical Theory: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 423 (1998); Tam B. 'Tan, Title VII Hostile Work Environment:
A Different Perspective, 9 J. CONTEMP. L. IssuEs 357, 371 (1998). According to Tam Trait, "critical
race feminism" was founded to focus exclusively on the oppression of women of color, because
CRT "was insufficient in calling attention to the gender element of racial oppresion." Trait, supra,
at 371. LatCrit theory, according to Jean Stefancic, is "a spin-off of Critical Race Theory, [which]
calls attention to the way in which conventional, and even critical [meaning CRT], approaches
to race and civil rights ignore the problems and special situations of Latino people—including
bilingualism, immigration reform, the binary black/white structure of existing race remedies law,
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rather than later. The hardscrabble, incremental world of legal reform
could use their help.
j EFEREY J. PYLE
